The first part of the course paves the way for the functionalist theory of mind. The integration of the latter with Turing's theory of computation forms the theoretical foundation of classical cognitive science, but not only. In fact, the most recent developments in cognitive science are also rooted in that integration.
Our starting point are some classic themes of the philosophical debate on the foundations of the modern scientific revolution. We will examine the development of a mechanist view of the physical world: what this mechanist worldview consists of, what are the implications on the ontological and epistemological level; Galilean and Cartesian epistemology; materialism and physicalism; reductionist and anti-reductionist readings of scientific theories; ontological pluralism (levels of reality), ontological emergence, epistemic emergence (supervenience).
b) The conceptual tension between mechanism and substance dualism in Descartes: the study of res extensa on the one hand, the mind-body problem on the other.
c) A brief history of the mind-body problem up to the functionalist theory of mind, which is proposed as a novel solution to the problem.
In the second part of the course, we will examine how the contributions that have come to psychology from game theory, sociology and experimental economics have created a happy union between these sciences and psychology over the last forty years. A new anthropology has emerged: human beings are neither naturally good nor naturally bad, and are naturally inclined to forms of sociality, cooperation, and even altruism, as well as, of course, competition and sometimes destructiveness. However, two forms of altruism must be distinguished. The most basic is the form of altruism aimed at the preservation of the kin group. A more evolved form of altruism is reciprocal altruism and involves ‘at risk’ cooperation between unrelated individuals, and sometimes even between strangers.
In the world of modernity and globalization, the possibility of a nation’s socio-economic take-off depends heavily on the spread of this form of ‘open’ or ‘extended’ cooperation. This takes shape when the zero-sum games produced by the familistic and tribal forms of cooperation melt away, and the relationships based on loyalty and trust are generalized to a collectiveness, i.e., a multitude of strangers who are willing to establish non-zero-sum relationships. In this perspective, the possibility of a socio-economic take-off involves a disposition to engage in relational practices and prominently depends on a specific relational motivation: the act of giving trust, construed as decision to entrust ourselves, according to our choice, to an interpersonal situation of risk within cooperation. It is possible, then, to make the hypothesis that good cooperation occurs only in virtue of a specific form of individualism that includes the concept of individual responsibility. For it is only through the permanent internalization of an ethics of individual responsibility that the strategies of trust among strangers can work effectively and prevail over the traditional tribal solidarity and the localist and nepotistical systems.